A Thorough Evaluation of the Compatibility of an E-Business Security Negotiations Support Tool by Jason R.C. Nurse & Jane E. Sinclair
A Thorough Evaluation of the Compatibility
of an E-Business Security Negotiations
Support Tool
Jason R.C. Nurse1 and Jane E. Sinclair2 
Abstract|For the benets of e-business to be fully
realized, there are numerous challenges to be over-
come particularly with respect to security. Some of
the most signicant of these diculties is incurred
even before businesses fully enter the joint e-business
interactions. A key example is the challenge faced
as partnering e-businesses come together initially to
share, compare and negotiate on their individual se-
curity needs. In previous work, we have proposed
a support tool to assist in this activity and stream-
line several of the dicult security negotiation tasks
which arise. This paper aims to advance the research
of that tool by engaging in a very detailed evaluation
of its compatibility with existing security needs deter-
mination methods (commonly, risk management and
assessment techniques). Compatibility forms a cru-
cial requirement as it evidences feasibility and yields
worthwhile initial feedback on the ultimate usefulness
and practicality of the tool.
Keywords: e-business negotiations, IT risk manage-
ment systems, security actions and requirements, se-
curity risks, ontology
1 Introduction
The importance of information security in today's fast-
paced business world cannot be neglected. In addition
to self-preservation and defending company assets, busi-
nesses are expected to subscribe to a variety of security
best practices (e.g. ISO 27000 series), and they must also
implement security measures to comply with a range of
legal/regulatory requirements (e.g. EU Data Protection
Act and Health Insurance Privacy and Portability Act).
When considering security approaches particularly across
collaborating e-businesses, the security situation becomes
exceedingly complex as partnering entities have a vari-
ety of dierent security needs, maintain diering security
postures, may have dissimilar laws/regulations which ap-
ply, have dierent skill sets/experience levels, and so on.
Work in [1] supports these diculties as the author labels
the related process, \security mayhem". To assist com-
panies in this collaboration process, especially in terms of
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security approaches in Web services-based interactions, in
previous work we have presented BOF4WSS, a Business-
Oriented Framework for enhancing Web Services Security
for e-business [2, 3]. The framework's novelty stemmed
from its focus on a cross-enterprise development method-
ology to help collaborating e-businesses in jointly creating
secure and trusted interactions. This would complement
existing approaches and best pratices such as [4, 5, 6].
Having created BOF4WSS, our emphasis has shifted to
providing systems and software to support it and assist in
its seamless application to business scenarios. In this pa-
per we extend work in [7] to look in greater detail at the
rst steps of an evaluation of one of these systems, which
was developed to support and ease security negotiation
across collaborating e-businesses. In terms of BOF4WSS,
this refers specically to easing the transition from the
Requirements Elicitation stage to the Negotiations stage.
Problems identied and targeted include: (i) understand-
ing other companies' security documentation|a variety
of formats and terminologies are used by companies to ex-
press their security needs; (ii) understanding the motiva-
tion behind other companies' security needs/decisions|
incomplete information provided initially, usually de-
mands that considerable time is spent later on determin-
ing core reasons for security needs; and (iii) being able to
easily match and compare security decisions from busi-
nesses which target the same situation|to identify com-
parable security decisions involves looking through part-
ners' security documents, and numerous tedious back-
and-forth communications. These problems, and the tool
(as well as its underlying Solution model) developed to
tackle them, are presented in detail in [8]. Evidence
to arm these problems has been provided by relevant
industry-based security professionals and related research
in [9].
As mentioned above, this paper focuses in detail on the
rst steps in the evaluation of the tool. Specically, we as-
sess the compatibility of the tool with existing Risk Man-
agement/Assessment (RM/RA) approaches; RM/RA ap-
proaches are relevant as companies typically use them to
make decisions on security risks and determine their se-
curity needs. Compatibility forms a critical requirement
because the information (on threats, vulnerabilities, risks,
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______________________________________________________________________________________ security needs, risk treatment options, motivational fac-
tors such as laws, security policies and so on) output by
these RM/RA approaches in BOF4WSS' Requirements
Elicitation stage, will need to be incorporated into the
tool to enable it to full its purpose. If the tool can cap-
ture a majority of the security-related information output
from popular RM/RA techniques, its compatibility and
feasibility as a tool that can work alongside current ap-
proaches used in businesses today will be evidenced.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 recaps the
Solution model and resulting tool to support security ne-
gotiations across e-businesses. In Section 3, we outline
the evaluation method followed. Sections 4 and 5 present
compatibility tests against two well-known RM/RA ap-
proaches. A reection on the evaluation ndings is cov-
ered in Section 6. Conclusions are presented in Section 7.
2 Solution Model and Tool
The Solution model is the conceptual base for the soft-
ware tool developed in our work. It consists of four
component stages: Security Actions Analysis, Ontology
Design, Language Denition, and Risk Catalogue Cre-
ation. The Security Actions Analysis stage focuses
on reviewing the literature in the security risk manage-
ment eld, and critically examining how security actions
and requirements were determined. A security action is
broadly dened as the way in which a company handles
the risk it faces (e.g. `maintaining availability of data cen-
ters is to be outsourced'), and a security requirement is a
high-to-medium level desire, expressed to mitigate a risk
(e.g. `all connections to the database must be authen-
ticated'). The key outcome of this stage is a thorough
understanding of the relevant security domain which can
then be used as a foundation for future stages.
The Ontology Design stage following, aims to produce
a high-level ontology design, using the ndings from the
previous stage, to establish a common understanding and
semantics structure of the security actions (and gener-
ally security risk management) domain. This common
or shared understanding is a critical prerequisite when
considering the diculties businesses faced (because of
dierent terminologies used, RM/RA methods applied,
and so on) as they try to understand their partners' secu-
rity documentation supplied in BOF4WSS' Negotiations
phase. The Security Actions Analysis and Ontology De-
sign stages (inclusive of a draft ontology) were discussed
in [10].
Next is the Language Denition stage and this has
two parts. First is the development of a XML-based
language called Security Action Denition Markup Lan-
guage (SADML). This allows for the establishment of a
common format (based on the ontology) by which secu-
rity actions/requirements information provided by com-
panies can be formally expressed, and also later processed
by the resulting tool. Second is the proposal of a user-
friendly interface such as a data entry screen or template
document by which businesses' security-related data can
be entered, and subsequently marked up in SADML. This
interface acts as a guide for companies in prompting them
to supply complete information as they prepare to come
together for negotiations.
The last stage is Risk Catalogue Creation, and that
addresses the problem of matching and comparing se-
curity actions/requirements across enterprises by den-
ing a shared risks catalogue. Given that businesses use
risks from this shared catalogue as input to their RM/RA
methods, regardless of the security actions that they de-
cided individually, the underlying risks can be used by
the tool to automatically match their actions. To increase
exibility, the catalogue would feature an extensive and
updatable set of security risks.
Having reviewed the Solution model, Figure 1 shows a
process ow of how the implemented model i.e. the tool,
works. In this diagram, Comp A and Comp B are com-
panies using BOF4WSS for an online business scenario.
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Figure 1: Process ow of implemented Solution model
First, companies would select a set of risks from the cat-
alogue that apply to the business scenario, and use these
as input to their dierent risk management methodolo-
gies/processes. Any new risks to be considered which are
not available in the catalogue, can be exchanged for this
scenario. After companies have used their RM/RA ap-
proaches to determine their individual security actions
(inclusive of motivational factors), these are then in-
put into the Data entry and storage (database) system.
This system uses a user-friendly interface to read in the
data (as suggested in the Language Denition stage) and
stores it to a back-end database to allow for data re-
trieval, updating and so on. This interface, and generally
the tool, mirror the understanding of concepts dened in
the ontology.
As companies are about to come together for Negotia-
tions, the Encoding system is used to read security data
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______________________________________________________________________________________ from the database and encode it into SADML. In the Ne-
gotiations stage of BOF4WSS, companies bring their in-
dividual SADML documents and these are passed to the
tool's Comparison system. This system matches compa-
nies' security actions based on risks which they address
and aims to provide a user-friendly interface in which (i)
security actions can be quickly compared and discussed,
(ii) any inconsistencies would be agged for follow-up by
personnel and (iii) a shared understanding of security
terms, risks and so on, will be upheld due to the refer-
ences that can be made to the ontology. Having reviewed
the model and tool, Section 3 begins the core contribu-
tion of this extended paper by presenting the evaluation
method that will be used to assess tool compatibility.
3 Evaluation Method
In evaluating the compatibility of the tool, the core ques-
tion was whether information output from typical com-
pany RM/RA methodologies could be accommodated
by, or mapped to the tool's Data entry and storage
(database) system. To guide this compatibility evalu-
ation, the method for mapping security guidelines and
standards to an existing ontology (both high-level and
formal) proposed in [11] was employed. This method
supplied a tested technique in which a detailed assess-
ment could be carried out to determine how well the
tool mapped, and thus was compatible with existing
RM/RA approaches. The Solution model's ontology was
extremely useful here as it embodied all the concepts im-
plemented in the tool. For the lower level mapping of
data, the tool's database Entity Relationship Diagram
(ERD) was referenced. This is the database that was the
back-end (or storage facility) for the Data entry system
to the tool. A table-level view of the ERD is presented
in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Tool's supporting ERD
A high-level description of the tool's ERD tables are as
follows:
Asset: Denes anything of value to a business
AssetSecurityAttribute: Allows the security attributes of
an asset to be dened
ActionTreatmentFactor: Denes treatment factors (e.g.,
laws, business policies, budgets and so on) that inuence
a security action
Project: Projects are dened for each RM/RA undertak-
ing or scenario
ProjectRisk: Denes risks that has been selected for use
in a particular project
ProjectRiskAction: Denes the risks which a security ac-
tion addresses. It also denes the level of coverage pro-
vided by the action
PrioritizationScheme: Allows the creation of metrics
(such as, High, Medium or Low) for each project that
would be used to value risks and rate probability, impact
and adequacy of controls
Risk: A risk is the potential that a threat will be lever-
aged by a threat agent to exploit a vulnerability in a given
asset resulting in harm to an organization
SecurityAction: Species the way in which a company
handles the risk(s) it faces
RiskEstimate: Denes the value of a risk, the probability
and impact of it occurring, and the eectiveness of cur-
rent controls in preventing that risk
SecurityAttribute: This is a property of an asset that is
to be preserved and is another term for an information
security goal. Examples of attributes are condentiality,
integrity, availability and accountability
Threat: A threat is an undesired event with an adverse
impact on an asset
ThreatAgent: Species the cause of a threat
ThreatSecurityAttribute: Allows the security attributes
which a threat aects to be outlined
TreatmentFactor: Denes the elements that aect the
treatment of a risk
TreatmentFactorType: Lists the generic types of treat-
ment factors
Vulnerability: A weakness in an asset or an existing se-
curity element intended to protect an asset
These descriptions and denitions are in line with those
in our ontology.
To provide the basis of the compatibility evaluation, two
RM/RA methodologies were chosen, namely CORAS [12]
and EBIOS [13]. These were selected because (i) they
are well-known and used, (ii) there was extensive docu-
mentation openly available on each and (iii) they had
supporting software which generated machine-readable
output (both provide XML-based documents). It is this
machine-readable output that is expected to be mapped
to, and ideally automatically read into the tool. Automa-
tion would suggest a promising mapping. The next sec-
tion begins tool evaluation by testing compatibility with
EBIOS.
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Figure 3: Mapping EBIOS concepts to the ontology
4 Testing Compatibility with EBIOS
EBIOS is a risk management approach created under the
French General Secretariat of National Defence. It pro-
poses a methodology and supporting software for assess-
ing and treating risks in the eld of information systems
security [13]. To test tool compatibility with EBIOS,
our research involved traversing all the steps advocated
in [11]. Focusing on the core of the work, this paper con-
centrates on the presentation of the high-level mapping
completed and the provision of key examples of how se-
curity information and knowledge (low-level data) from
EBIOS, was mapped to the tool's data entry elds and
ultimately, its database.
The high-level mapping of EBIOS concepts to the So-
lution model's ontology is displayed in Figure 3; ontol-
ogy concepts are in boxes with unbroken lines, whereas
EBIOS concepts have dashed lines. From this mapping
one can easily visualize high-level similarities across mod-
els and also begin to identify concepts that do not map.
Ontology concepts were largely discussed in [10] with the
main updates here being the use of the term security ac-
tion as opposed to risk action, and the introduction of
security attribute (a property of an asset that is to be
preserved e.g. condentiality, integrity, availability and
accountability), security requirement (dened prior), and
treatment (the known degree to which a security action
covers a risk) concepts.
Some of the more interesting concepts covered by EBIOS
include a menace, which denes a threat to an entity (or
asset); a constraint described as a limitation faced by the
organization; a security objective which is the expression
of the intention to counter risks or threats and/or com-
ply with the organizational security policies and other as-
sumptions; a security functional requirement, a security
function to be implemented to contribute to the fulll-
ment of a security objective; and an assurance require-
ment, dened as the specication of assurance provided
by security functions implemented to cover security ob-
jectives [13].
To evaluate the tool compatibility at a lower level, we
now consider mapping actual output generated from a
RA study conducted using EBIOS software, to the tool's
database Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD). For the
tests, two output examples are used in this research. Both
highlight concepts central to an EBIOS study. The rst
is presented below; this code covers EBIOS' XML repre-
sentation of a Menace.
<Menace ID="Menace.1050437920519" label="19 - EAVESDROPPING"
selected="true" description="Type: Human. Deliberate
cause: Someone connected to communication equipment/media
or located inside the transmission coverage boundaries
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______________________________________________________________________________________ of a communication can use equipment, which may be very
expensive, to listen to, save and analyze the information
transmitted (voice or data). ..." justification=""
descriptionMenaceElement="" potentiel=
"AttackPotential.1070307963407">
<MenaceThemeList ID="MenaceThemeList.1244991940438">
<Theme id="Theme.1014431415703" comments="" />
</MenaceThemeList>
<SeverityScale ID="SeverityScale.1050985081072">
<MenaceSeverity ID="MenaceSeverity.1244928987097"
criteria="Criteria.1014877221686" severity="1"
violation="true" />
</SeverityScale>
<MenaceCauseList ID="MenaceCauseList.1244991940438">
<MenaceCause id="MenaceCause.1011656568285" comments="" />
</MenaceCauseList>
<MenaceOrigineList ID="MenaceOrigineList.1244991940438">
<MenaceOrigine id="MenaceOrigine.1052902060343" comments="" />
</MenaceOrigineList>
</Menace>
The XML excerpt describes EBIOS knowledge of an
eavesdropping menace faced by a system in an RA study.
To start, a Menace in EBIOS was mapped to a Threat
in the tool. Considering the lower level, the selected at-
tribute of the Menace XML element was assessed rst.
This attribute dened whether or not a menace was se-
lected from the dataset of menaces and thus whether it
applied to the current RA study. A `true' value indi-
cated that it was selected and thus the Menace should
be mapped (or specically, transferred) to the tool's
database and ERD.
The label and description attributes of the men-
ace present descriptive information about the ERD's
Threat concept and so were mapped to the elds
Threat.threat name and ProjectRisk.threat details respec-
tively. To accommodate the latter of these mappings, it
was noted that there would need to be an EBIOS' Risk
related to the Menace and it would need to have been
mapped previously (to a tool/ERD's Risk and Projec-
tRisk record). This would allow the menace description
data to be added to the ERD ProjectRisk record. Neither
the justication, descriptionMenaceElement, or potentiel
attributes had mappable elds in the ERD.
The MenaceThemeList sub-element listed the EBIOS
attack method themes from which the Menace was
deduced. The related Theme element (theme id
`Theme.1014431415703') in this case represented the
`Compromise of information' attack method. As the
ERD did not maintain the overarching concept of attack
themes however, mapping was not achieved.
The SeverityScale element allowed for an exact mapping
(apart from the severity and violation attributes) because
its focus, that is, Criteria, corresponds to the Security-
Attribute table data in the tool/ERD. The SeverityScale
element allows for Security Criteria (such as availabil-
ity, integrity and so on) that the menace aects to be
specied. In this example, the criteria aected is `Con-
dentiality', which is represented by the unique id `Cri-
teria.1014877221686'. To map this Menace knowledge
to the tool, the SecurityAttribute and ThreatSecurityAt-
tribute tables were used. SecurityAttribute and speci-
cally SecurityAttribute.attribute name stored the types of
security criteria (or attributes in the tool), whereas the
ThreatSecurityAttribute table and the database record
created provided the link between a Menace/Threat and
the aected Criteria/SecurityAttribute.
The nal two sub-elements, MenaceCauseList and Men-
aceOrigineList, list the causes (MenaceCause) and origins
(MenaceOrigine) of the threat respectively. In the ERD,
MenaceCause data mapped to the Threat.threat type eld
of the current eavesdropping menace database record.
Generally this mapping was ideal as the specic Men-
aceCause, `MenaceCause.1011656568285', refers to a `De-
liberate' menace cause and therefore corresponds to the
ERD's `Intentional' threat type option (which is shown in
the ontology).
For the MenaceOrigine element within the MenaceO-
rigineList, a relation was found in the Threat.agent id
eld. To enable this mapping the ThreatAgent table
was also required. This is because the menace's ori-
gin, that is, `Human' (indicated by unique id `Menace-
Origine.1052902060343'), would rst map to the respec-
tive ThreatAgent database record (identied by ThreatA-
gent.agent type and in this case `Human' as well). Then
the agent id would be copied to the eavesdropping record
in the Threat table.
Figure 4 pulls together the mapping example and displays
a screenshot of the database records (in their respective
tables) that would be created in our tool as a result of
the mapping. In later stages this type of data would
then be exported to SADML when companies are ready
to compare and reconcile their security actions.
Figure 4: Mapped Menace data
The next knowledge mapping example was based on the
EBIOS SecurityObjective element. The XML snippet be-
low describes the security objective dened in the RA
study. This objective was to treat the risk associated
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______________________________________________________________________________________ with the menace identied in the previous example.
<SecurityObjective ID="SecurityObjective.1248768933881" label=
"Eavesdropping protection objective" state="" baseID=""
type="EBIOS.Text.SO.Type.TOE" content="The organization must
take measures to ensure there is no eavesdropping on data,
persons, meetings, etc..." resistance="3"
resistance_justification="" coverLevel=
"SecurityRequirementCover.1076860509716" ...>
<SecurityObjectiveCovers>
<SecurityObjectiveCover ID="SecurityObjectiveCover.
1245667560533" reference="RiskScenario.1248601769338"
type="Risk" />
</SecurityObjectiveCovers>
</SecurityObjective>
To consider the mapping, a SecurityObjective in EBIOS
corresponds to a SecurityAction table record in the ERD.
Analyzing the concept's XML attributes, label which is
the name of a security objective, mapped to SecurityAc-
tion.sa name, and content, a description of the objective,
mapped to the ERD's SecurityAction.action remarks.
None of the other attributes allowed for a mapping be-
cause no related elds existed in the tool ERD.
The SecurityObjectiveCovers sub-element lists aspects
(risks, constraints, regulatory requirements, and so on)
addressed by the current security objective. The type
attribute of individual SecurityObjectiveCover elements
marked the type of aspect addressed, here it is a
Risk. In this example, a mapping was made between
the risk addressed (identied by unique id `RiskSce-
nario.1248601769338') and a database record in the Pro-
jectRiskAction table (this table holds risks which a secu-
rity action addresses). Lastly, and more at a general level,
because the SecurityObjective element does not dene a
type (i.e. whether it is geared towards risk mitigation,
assumption, and so on) some manual intervention was
required to complete the mapping to the SecurityAction
table and thus provide data for the record's action type
eld. A screenshot of the actual records in their respec-
tive tables within the tool database is shown in Figure 5,
before general reections on mappings done thus far.
Figure 5: Mapped SecurityObjective data
The principal aim of conducting the mapping process was
to evaluate the compatibility of the tool and embodied
ontology, with existing RM/RA approaches. Having com-
pleted the mapping of EBIOS, it can be seen that vari-
ous of the main concepts and elements could be mapped,
both at ontology and ERD levels. This has demonstrated
promising evidence to support the case for tool compati-
bility. Of equal interest however are the concepts and ele-
ment attributes that proved challenging to map, as these
might indicate noteworthy shortcomings of the tool. Be-
low, the primary diculties incurred are discussed.
No consideration of assurance of security func-
tions: Beyond dening security objectives, and security
functional requirements that implement them, EBIOS
uses security assurance requirements to provide assurance
that functional requirements adequately achieve the ob-
jectives they are to implement. Reecting on the tool
and ontology, while both include concepts mappable to
security objective and security requirement, neither ac-
commodated the security assurance concept. For EBIOS
mapping, this fact acted to highlight a weakness in the
tool and ontology (specically in their ability to capture
all security aspects), and hence aected compatibility.
From a general perspective however, because the assur-
ance concept was not prevalent in the range of popular
RM/RA methodologies examined in [10], it may not be a
standard concept in this context. Rather, a peculiarity of
the EBIOS technique. Nonetheless, assurance is a gener-
ally well-accepted security facet therefore might need to
be accommodated in the tool and ontology model.
Low-level dierences between EBIOS' Security
objective and the tool's Security action: At a high
level, SecurityObjective and SecurityAction are semanti-
cally similar, and thus allowed for a seamless mapping of
concepts. When assessed in detail however, as seen in the
lower-level mapping attempted, a few dierences emerged
(related to attributes and elements) which complicate the
process. One such dierence deals with the inability to
identify an appropriate action type (mitigation, trans-
ference, and so on) for the corresponding SecurityAction
database record without manual intervention.
The next dierence is centered around the fact that in
EBIOS, a security objective can be conceived to address
a range of aspects including risks, constraints, regulatory
requirements, and security rules/policies. This is a novel
fact because it exemplies a direct relationship between
a security objective and aspects that are not risks. This
relationship was not represented in the tool or ontology.
To take an example, in the tool and ontology, a Security
action or risk action is conceived with the prime aim of
treating a risk. Aspects such as those mentioned above
i.e. constraints, regulatory requirements, and security
rules/policies, are mainly viewed as constructs that in-
uence the treatment of the risk. This is as opposed to
constructs which independently give rise to security ac-
tions or general security needs.
Only one security requirement or detailed treat-
ment method for a security action: EBIOS allows
for the use of multiple security functional requirements to
implement a single security objective; in essence a one-
to-many relationship. Conversely, the tool only accom-
modates one security requirement or detailed treatment
IAENG International Journal of Computer Science, 37:4, IJCS_37_4_07
(Advance online publication: 23 November 2010)
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ Asset
has
Risk
Threat Threat
Agent Vulnerability
exploits
has
leverages
Risk Level
Contractual
Obligations
Security
Budget
Policy
considers
considers
implemented by
Mitigation
Action
Transference
Action
Preventative Detective Corrective
Business
Policy
Security
Policy
Avoidance
Action
Acceptance
Action
Control Security
Requirement
uses
Laws and
Regulations
measures
effectiveness
of
Intentional
Natural
Accidental
Security
Attribute
affects
requires
Treatment
Coverage Level
Natural Human
Environmental Asset
Risk Value
Likelihood
Treatment
Threat
Unwanted
Incident
Consequence
Vulnerability
Risk
People
Service
Property
Risk Rating
Factor
Impact
Factor
Probability
Factor
Adequacy of
Controls Factor
A is related to B
B is a subclass of A
B is made up of A
A B
A B
A B
A maps to B A B
Security
Action
Figure 6: Mapping CORAS concepts to the ontology
method for each database SecurityAction record; that is,
one-to-one. This dierence in cardinality causes an ob-
vious disparity during the mapping process as there is
an inability to link multiple detailed treatment meth-
ods (in EBIOS, security functional requirements) to a
single Security action (in EBIOS, security objective).
From a practical perspective, the one-to-many relation-
ship present in EBIOS should also be represented in the
tool because such scenarios are foreseeable in reality. Its
exclusion highlights an oversight in design and implemen-
tation.
With the compatibility tests with EBIOS complete, in the
next section we consider tool compatibility with CORAS.
5 Testing Compatibility with CORAS
CORAS [12] is the product of an EU research project tar-
geted towards creating a tool-supported methodology for
model-based risk analysis of security-critical systems. To
report on the evaluation in terms of CORAS, the same
process (i.e. high-level mapping, and information map-
ping example) used for EBIOS above is reused here. Fig-
ure 6 therefore presents the high-level mapping accom-
plished. As seen from the mapping, a majority of CORAS
concepts are found in the ontology. Its unwanted incident
and threat concepts proved the most intriguing during
mapping, as they covered multiple concepts in the on-
tology. Formally, an unwanted incident is an event that
reduces the value of assets, whereas a threat, dened as
a potential cause of an unwanted incident, this encom-
passed the human, or non-human cause [12]. A full de-
scription of all CORAS concepts can be found in [12].
To conduct the mapping of actual CORAS output data
next, a case study was prepared in the CORAS software,
and then exported to its project XML format. The soft-
ware's Help section and a case study by Fu et al. [14]
which used CORAS, guided scenario preparation. As
with EBIOS, default settings were used in the CORAS
software and customization was kept at a minimum to
maintain an objective mapping. In this low-level map-
ping here, we report on two examples to test the ability of
the tool to map CORAS data. These cover threat scenar-
ios, and risk identication and estimation. The mapping
commences with the threat scenario XML below.
<row>
<cell columnId="scenarioId">SNR-1</cell>
<cell columnId="assetId">StaffNetwork1</cell>
<cell columnId="reference">Sequence diagram 1 documentation
</cell>
<cell columnId="threat">Malicious party</cell>
<cell columnId="vulnerability">Circulating information in
clear text</cell>
<cell columnId="incident">Unauthorized disclosure of
customer personal data</cell>
<cell columnId="scenario">Accessing and stealing of
customers personal data</cell>
</row>
The code snippet above was taken from the CORAS Sce-
nario Table and describes various aspects pertaining to a
single threat scenario. A threat scenario or simply sce-
nario, is how a threat leads to an unwanted incident. At
the high level, an association has previously been made
from data in this table (for example, threat scenario and
incident) to the ontology and ERD's Threat concept. To
conduct the lower-level mapping, the rst task was to en-
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threat columnId in the code snippet) already existed in
the respective ERD table, which is the ThreatAgent ta-
ble. If there was no record, it needed to be created. The
respective ERD agent id eld data (for that threat cause)
was then used, in addition to the CORAS incident (short
for unwanted incident) and scenario data to create a new
Threat database record in our tool.
To consider the mapping in greater detail, the threat
cause's agent id was copied from the respective ThreatA-
gent record to the new Threat record's Threat.agent id
eld. This sets up the database foreign key relation-
ship. Also, the incident data formed the main input to
the same Threat record's Threat.threat name eld. Data
from the CORAS scenario element was appended to the
record's threat name data to provide an additional de-
scription of the new ERD Threat record. Appending this
data however was not a panacea as it proved appropriate
only if an incident had one associated scenario. CORAS
allows multiple threat scenarios to culminate in one or
more incidents; which could mean multiple rows (<row>)
in the Scenario Table with the same incident data but
dierent scenario data.
Regarding the Scenario Table's assetId, reference and vul-
nerability elements, there was no mapping to the ERD's
Threat database record. The vulnerability element is piv-
otal in later stages however as it denes the related exist-
ing vulnerability which, along with a threat, constitute
data for an ERD Risk record. This aspect would there-
fore be revisited when mapping risks. Figure 7 gives a
visual presentation of the mapped data as it is captured
in our tool's database.
Figure 7: Mapped Scenario table
The second example of knowledge mapping uses the Con-
sequence and Frequency Table in CORAS. This table de-
nes risks, makes the link to associated unwanted inci-
dents, and values each risk in terms of consequence (im-
pact of an unwanted incident on an asset in terms of loss
of asset value) and frequency (the probability for an un-
wanted incident to occur). The code follows.
<row>
<cell columnId="riskId">RSK-1</cell>
<cell columnId="assetId">Network1</cell>
<cell columnId="incident">Unauthorized disclosure of customer
personal data</cell>
<cell columnId="consequenceValue">Moderate</cell>
<cell columnId="frequencyValue">Likely</cell>
<cell columnId="scenario"/>
</row>
To map the risk dened in the <row> element above,
the ERD's Risk and ProjectRisk tables were employed.
After creating a new Risk database record, the riskId el-
ement's data was mapped to the Risk.risk id eld. For
the CORAS row's assetId, the respective asset's unique
identier (i.e. asset id in the ERD Asset table) for
`Network1' was copied to Risk.asset id. A similar pro-
cess was adopted for the incident element as this would
correspond to a record already in the ERD Threat ta-
ble. The unique identier copied was threat id, and it
was copied to the Risk.threat id eld. To complete the
ERD Risk record, the incident's respective vulnerabil-
ity from the CORAS software Scenario Table was used.
Once the incident's vulnerability was found (note that
in each row in the CORAS Scenario Table is an inci-
dent and a respective vulnerability), the ERD's Vulnera-
bility table was searched for that vulnerability's name
(on the Vulnerability.vulnerability name eld). When
the database record was identied the vulnerability id
eld was copied/mapped to the respective Risk record's
Risk.vulnerability id eld.
The last task was mapping CORAS consequence and fre-
quency data. Assuming that metrics (i.e. allowed val-
ues) for these factors were set to be the same in both
CORAS and the tool (note that metrics can be added
to the tool using PrioritizationScheme ERD table), the
`moderate' consequence in CORAS mapped to `moderate'
value for the impact eld in the tool's RiskEstimate ta-
ble. Whereas the `likely' frequency mapped to the `likely'
value for the probability eld in ERD's RiskEstimate ta-
ble. For the mapping above to be conducted however,
a ProjectRisk database record was required rst. From
the ERD, it would be noted that ProjectRisk supplies the
physical link between a Risk and a RiskEstimate. Once
this record was created and associated with the Risk un-
der analysis, the unique pr id key value generated was
copied to a new RiskEstimate record. The relevant im-
pact and probability values were then copied to that new
RiskEstimate record. As before, a screenshot is presented
in Figure 8 to show the resulting mappings in the tool
database.
As might be noted from the mapping above, the tool does
require companies to rst synchronize information on el-
ements such as risk and risk ids to be used (recall that
tool comparison is made largely based on common risks),
and the metrics for risk valuation i.e. ensuring companies
use similar valuation schemes and agree on the meanings
of individual metrics. Having completed the mapping of
the security information from CORAS software output to
the tool's ERD and ontology, the following paragraphs
discuss the more salient observations made during the
general mapping process.
Reecting on the general CORAS mapping, there were
many high- and low-level concepts that evidenced com-
patibility of the tool. This was so promising that an
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automated mapping between the CORAS software and
the tool would be almost seamless. The main problems
that could prohibit this are highlighted below.
Dierences in Threat representation: In the tool
and ontology, a Threat concept denes an undesired
event which has an adverse impact on an asset. Within
CORAS, this threat notion is understood in a slightly dif-
ferent way which caused the need for the unwanted inci-
dent and threat scenario (or threat) concepts in CORAS,
to map to the single Threat concept in the ontology. The
diculty at this point therefore is deciding exactly how to
map low-level CORAS data, to the tool's database. One
option was to map a CORAS unwanted incident to a
ERD's Threat (as these denitions are quite similar) and
then discard data in the CORAS threat scenario eld.
The disadvantage of this however was losing data which
provided more descriptive information on what actions
(or causes) constituted a threat to an asset. The second
option involved concatenating related data in the CORAS
unwanted incident and threat scenario elds, and then
mapping that data to records in the ERD's Threat table.
This option however would lead to multiple threats (a
new ERD Threat record for each unwanted incident and
threat scenario pair) for a single risk. This is not a map-
ping the tool's ERD at present could accommodate. The
rst option was therefore preferred in most mappings.
Grouping of risks: Within CORAS, a shortcut mech-
anism is supplied that allows risks to be grouped into
categories. These categories are used to allow a group of
risks to be estimated using a single risk value and then
treated using a single risk treatment. Such a grouping
of risks functionality however does not exist in our tool's
ERD. To enable for mapping therefore, risk categories
needed to be broken down such that each risk was viewed
individually. One interesting fact noted in the groupings
was the facility to value/estimate a group of risks. This
functionality was not accommodated in the tool or on-
tology but its use could be seen especially in cases where
a set of related and minimal risks were grouped for joint
valuation.
In the proposed mapping process itself, a noteworthy
caveat was identied when extracting risks from within
CORAS risk categories. This problem was linked to the
suggested mapping's assumption that a risk category's
value would be applied to each individual risk when the
category was broken down. For example, assuming a
group of risks have level `High', if they were to be consid-
ered separately, each of their individual levels would also
be `High'. This however may not be the case as a system
user (security professional or analyst) might have chosen
to modify a risk category's valuation level depending on
the combined consequence and frequency values of all the
risks in the category. As a result of this fact, some manual
intervention may be necessary during mapping to conrm
each risk's individual risk value when risk categories are
being broken down.
Determining actual risk treatments: CORAS and
the tool and ontology, both acknowledge the need for risk
treatment concepts. In the CORAS software, they be-
gin by listing all possible treatment options in the Treat-
ment Identication Table. Next, in the Treatment Eval-
uation Table, they evaluate all the treatments and use
priority values to rate them. The diculty in mapping
was because the tool only accommodated actual treat-
ments which were chosen to address a risk. Therefore,
the treatment evaluation process documented in CORAS,
was taken to be complete from the tool perspective.
Another diculty faced was the identication of the spe-
cic treatment which would handle a risk. The CORAS
software and its output, maintained no data elds or fa-
cility which clearly highlighted a chosen treatment. The
treatmentPriority element in the Treatment Evaluation
Table was considered to aid in mapping, however, be-
cause there was no predened hierarchy of metrics (e.g.
high, medium, low) in the CORAS software, the possi-
bilities of values used by companies to rate their treat-
ments was innite, and thus not mappable. To allow for
mapping therefore, a manual process was required where
treatments (from the Treatment Identication Table) to
be mapped from CORAS to the tool were identied by
a user. The use of a manual means for mapping was not
ideal but was necessary as it was the only way to deni-
tively identify a treatment to be mapped from CORAS.
6 Reecting on the Evaluation
Both EBIOS and CORAS proved useful and insightful
methods which aided in this research's evaluation. They
are widely used risk management and assessment tech-
niques which collect and generate a variety of risk and
security data and information. Out of the two meth-
ods, EBIOS had the more comprehensive and detailed
methodology and software, and it also had the most un-
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mapped concepts was not ideal (as it does not arm com-
patibility), in retrospect, the reason for the diculties
incurred might be linked to the nature of EBIOS. Recall
that EBIOS was developed under government direction
(National Defense) and geared towards government in-
dustries [13]. The method therefore might be geared to
very high security environments. This reality would ac-
count for the critical value and detail placed on security
and security assurance (for example, the various elds
for security data, coverage levels for risks and security
objectives, and so on).
The CORAS technique oered a less detailed and more
standard methodology and software. The mapping di-
culties present with CORAS were not serious and hardly
any main concepts diered across models (that is, from
CORAS to the tool/ontology). CORAS did not introduce
any new profound concepts either. Generally therefore,
the dierences were regarded as trivial and stylistic, and
ones which could be easily accommodated during map-
ping by occasional manual intervention.
To briey consider the methodology by Fenz et al. [11]
used for the mapping, this supplied a tested technique
from the literature to guide and add structure to the on-
tology mapping process. This technique was useful and
easy to follow, albeit partially targeted at formal ontolo-
gies as opposed to database schemas or diagrams.
In terms of identifying specic scenarios, industries or
RM/RA methodology types in which the proposed tool
and ontology would prove more favourable to be applied,
none were evident from the mapping of these two method-
ologies. It was clear however that basic risk concepts
could be handled and therefore any methodology utilizing
standard RM/RA concepts should allow for an adequate
mapping.
Having discussed the high-level mappings and applica-
ble usage scenarios, reection turned to the lower-level
aspects. To begin, an assessment was done to nd any
common weaknesses of the tool or ontology, that were in-
curred during mappings to both EBIOS and CORAS. If
present, these might highlight areas where further work or
modications in the tool/ontology were warranted. From
this assessment however, no common weaknesses were
discovered.
Looking to the future, the next step was to consider the
capabilities of each methodology and identify any as-
pects worth adopting to boost the compatibility of the
tool/ontology to these or any other RM/RA methods.
Other popular methods such as the NIST SP 800-30:
Risk Management Guide [15] and OCTAVE [16] were
also briey studied to determine if there was any support
for adopting novel EBIOS or CORAS aspects. From a
research perspective, these considerations look to learn
from and react to the general evaluation ndings. Four
aspects were chosen; three from EBIOS and one from
CORAS. The choices made were primarily because the
aspects were general enough to apply to any RM/RA
method and also because they addressed what were re-
garded as key shortcomings in the tool/ontology.
These aspects were: (i) allowing a Security action to
directly address aspects other than Risks, for example,
laws and regulations, technical constraints and so on|
therefore its new meaning is `any way in which to ad-
dress a risk, or a constraint to a organization or system';
(ii) adding the capability to have multiple Security re-
quirements address or cover one Security action|this is
a necessity in real-world situations; (iii) introducing a
generic Constraint concept which encapsulates all con-
straints (such as security budget and contractual obli-
gations) that aect a risk's treatment, or all constraints
that need to be addressed directly by a Security action
(see point (i)); and lastly (iv) the facility to map and
store risk treatment evaluation data.
Aspect (iv) above does not address a shortcoming as such
but is suggested because it could be benecial when busi-
nesses using the tool are trying to reconcile Security ac-
tions. If this evaluation data could be mapped from a
RM/RA methodology, the tool could use it to display
alternate risk treatments (along with risk reduction lev-
els, treatment priorities and so on, if they exist) which
companies might wish to consider in making reconcilia-
tion decisions. All four of the extensions suggested above
would add greater exibility to the tool and ontology,
and increase chances of compatibility with more RM/RA
methodologies and their software.
Factoring in some of these extensions, a rst draft of an
updated ontology is displayed in Figure 9. A new respec-
tive ERD has also been developed and will be seen next.
As these are drafts, further tests will be needed to ver-
ify their rigour, identify any accompanying problems and
make any other necessary updates.
The new ERD draft is displayed in Figure 10. As done
with the previous entity diagram in Figure 2, a high-level
description of the tool's ERD tables is below (only new
or updated tables are described):
Constraint: Denes limitations faced by the organiza-
tion. These limitations can inuence the treatment of
a risk or give rise to a security action themselves (This
replaces and extends TreatmentFactor to some extent)
ConstraintSecurityAction: Denes the constraints ad-
dressed by a security action. It also denes the level of
coverage provided by the security action
ConstraintType: Lists the generic types of constraints
ProjectRiskSecurityAction: Denes the risks which a
security action addresses. It also denes the level of
coverage provided by the security action.
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Figure 9: Draft of the new ontology
Figure 10: Draft of the new ERD to support the tool
RiskTreatmentConstraint: This denes constraints (e.g.,
laws, business policies, budgets and so on) that inuence
a risk's treatment, i.e. a security action
SecurityDetail: Denes measures used to implement
security actions. Mitigation security actions are reected
in security requirement elds whereas transference,
avoidance and acceptance security actions are reected
in the generic security detail eld
SecurityAction: Denes any way in which to address
a risk, or a constraint to a organization or system.
This concept is an extension of the previous ERD's
SecurityAction
One general foreseen weakness of the updates suggested
above is that as risks no longer form the sole basis for
security actions, the tool's current matching of risks to
compare actions will no longer be fully adequate. Possible
options to be investigated for comparing security actions
based on non-risk components (primarily these will be
Constraints) are centered around the matching of con-
straint groups or some other common constraint denomi-
nator. For example, comparing Security actions based on
the types of Constraint that they address. These Con-
straint types could be laws or budget-related as seen in
Figure 9, or more detailed and thus focus on data privacy,
specic system types, or even organizational limitations.
The general incompatibilities and diculties in mapping
in previous sections do raise very interesting questions
concerning how the tool and ontology would handle other
RM/RA methodologies. For example, there is the reality
that other methodologies will have varying concepts, ap-
proach risks in dierent ways and so on. Any future map-
ping techniques to be developed therefore need to more
aptly appreciate this and either: provide some generic
way for dierences to be included; allow for an extensi-
ble framework where support for new approaches can be
plugged in; or enable these concepts to be treated some-
how externally to the system. The reections in this sec-
tion supply a good start for further work.
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The focus of this paper was assessing the compatibility of
our proposed tool and the ontology which it embodied,
with RM/RA methodologies used by businesses today.
In particular, this paper aimed to extend the work in [7]
by providing more detail on the thorough evaluation con-
ducted. As stated previously, a good level of tool com-
patibility was imperative given the necessary interactions
between the tool and these RM/RA approaches expected
within BOF4WSS. From the comparison and mapping
evaluation completed, it was seen that a majority of the
ndings were in support of the tool/ontology compatibil-
ity. In some situations however, noteworthy shortcom-
ings of the tool/ontology were discovered and in these
cases, updates were drafted to address them. Broadly
considered nonetheless, the tool and the Solution Model
it implemented were seen to aid in resolving a number of
the transitional issues businesses face in coming together
for negotiations in the framework.
Future work will consist of rst updating the tool based
on ndings and reections in this paper. Secondly, we
aim to conduct interviews with security professionals to
gather their feedback on the value of the tool from a
practical perspective. Then, once nal prototypes are
developed, our research will assess how well the tool
works when used to support companies in a real world
e-business collaboration scenario.
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